In this paper, we assume that the mathematicians in proving new significant theorem, such as Fermat's Last Theorem, deal with combining proof trees on tree forests by using the analogy as an inference metarule. In other words, the real mathematical proofs cannot be formalized as discrete sequences, but they are concurrent and can by formalized as analog processes within a space with some topological properties. For the first time, inference metarules in a topological space were proposed in the Talmud within a general Judaic approach to concurrent or even massive-parallel conclusions. The mathematician does not think sequentially like a logical automaton, but concurrently, also. Hence, we suppose that the proof technique of real mathematics cannot be formalized by discrete methods. It is just a hypothesis of the foundations of mathematics that we can use discrete tools so that mathematics can be reduced to logic. We show in the paper how the mathematical proof can be formalized just by analog computations, not discrete ones.
INTRODUCTION
The Principia Mathematica, a three-volume work written jointly by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell and published in 1910, 1912, and 1913 , was the first book i.e. in fact it was the first attempt to make explicitly mathematics from the point of view of symbolic logic, that is an attempt to consider mathematical theorems as logical statements which are automatically inferred from axioms by logical inference rules. To continue and enhance this approach, David Hilbert, the German mathematician (1862-1943), put forward a new proposal for the foundation of mathematics called the Finite Program (or Hilbert's Program). In this proposal all of mathematics should have been formalized in axiomatic form, together with a proof by 'finitary' methods proposed by Hilbert that this axiomatization is consistent.
Now there are some basic formal theories which are regarded as start points in the foundations of mathematics. This means that these theories, in the way how it seems to mathematicians, can cover big fragments of mathematics by their extensions. For instance, it is assumed that in the foundations for number theory we should start from the five Peano's axioms, introduced by Giuseppe Peano in 1889 and now called the Peano arithmetic PA. Also, it is supposed that any set-theoretic reasoning in mathematics (like reasoning in topology) can be reduced to statements formalized in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, constructed by mathematicians Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel and denoted by the abbreviation ZFC, where C means axiom of choice.
To sum up, mathematicians believe still that the foundations of mathematics in the meaning of Principia Mathematica are possible and any correct well-done mathematical reasoning can be rewritten in a logical theory such as ZFC. So, they believe that all the mathematics can be reduced to a logic. Is it true indeed? Is it possible?
In mathematics there are really non-trivial theorems which are so deep that they cannot be inferred without introducing absolutely new mathematical constructions. For example, Fermat's Last Theorem (FLT) is well formulated in PA. Therefore this statement seems to be so simple. For the first time, FLT was put forward by Pierre de Fermat in 1637 in the margin of a copy of Arithmetica. However, this statement was proven formally only after 358 years of effort by mathematicians, namely by Andrew Wiles in 1995 [6] . The most dramatic problem of FLT recently is that this theorem is proved mathematically and this proof was accepted by mathematical communities, but this statement was not checked by logicians at all. It is unknown still whether there is a logical proof of FLT. In other words, FLT is not covered by any foundations of mathematics still.
As we said, FLT is well written in a first-order sentence of PA. However, it does not mean that it can be proved in PA. After the Paris-Harrington theorem [3] , it is well known that there are ever first-order arithmetic statements written in PA which cannot be proved in PA, such as the Strong Ramsey Theorem that can easily be proved in the second-order arithmetic from the infinite version of the standard theorem. Also, it is known that there are many other combinatorial problems that are beyond PA. In [2] , Colin McLarty supposed that FLT can be proved in some higherorder extensions of PA, but nobody has checked it still.
Another hypothesis of McLarty [2] is that FLT is beyond ZFC. It is quite evident taking into account the fact that cohomological number theory used by Wiles [6] is based on Grothendieck's universes which model ZFC, but the existence of a universe is not provable in ZFC. Grothendieck's own axiom of universes, which was added to ZFC, affirms that every set is contained in some universe (there is an uncountable strongly inaccessible cardinal for sets) [1] . Hence, in cohomology we deal with ZFC+U consisting of ZFC with the assumption U of a universe. So, FLT can be proved at least in ZFC+U or even in higher extensions, and evidently not in ZFC. Nevertheless, there is no formal proof still what is set theory looks like for FLT.
Thus, there are ever serious mathematical theorems such as FLT which are beyond the recent foundations of mathematics (for instance, beyond PA or ZFC). However, mathematicians and logicians unconsciously obey the quite religious faith and follow the deep-inner intuition that any mathematical theorem can be reduced to a theorem of existed symbolic logic. In symbolic logic we appeal to a formal theory Ti that possesses logical axioms/theorems (a We assume that logical fragments are well studied in the foundations of mathematics, but new constructions are not yet. The true mathematical task is to give non-trivial essential theorems containing new constructions. The mathematician starts his work with logical fragments to obtain new constructions later.
Thus, the higher mathematics is eternally to extend forests of (a ) just looking at existing forests. In Section 3 we will show how we can use these methods in the recent foundations of mathematics. Hence, the Talmudic metareasoning in the foundations of mathematics are called by us 'Talmudic foundations of mathematics', see [4] , [5] . We assume that in a real mathematical practice mathematicians use a similar metareasoning to build up new forests by looking at existing forests (let us notice that this metareasoning is considered often as a mathematical intuition).
WHAT IS TALMUDIC LOGIC?
Usually, the term 'Talmudic logic' means the Judaic hermeneutic rules (Hebrew: middot, ‫)מידות‬ [4] , first formulated as a special hermeneutics by Hillel in the 1st century B.C. . Now, let us consider an example from Exodus 22 and let us try to build up a proof tree for the notion 'responsibility for the property of his neighbour', just basing on the text of the Torah. We have the following statements mentioned in this chapter of the Holy Book: G "He is responsible for the property of his neighbour."
G1 "The neighbour's property is given for safekeeping for free of charge."
G2 "The neighbour's property is given for safekeeping for money."
G3 "The neighbour's property is borrowed."
G1P1 "The safekeeping for free of charge is stolen. He should swear that he did not lay his hand upon his neighbor's property."
If a man shall deliver unto his neighbour money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen out of the man's house; if the thief be found, let him pay double. If the thief be not found, then the master of the house shall be brought unto the judges, to see whether he have put his hand unto his neighbour's goods (KJV, Exodus, 22:7-8).
G2P1 "The safekeeping for money is stolen. He should pay the loss."
G2P2 "The safekeeping for money is destroyed for natural reasons. He should swear that he did not lay his hand upon his neighbor's property."
If a man deliver unto his neighbour an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to keep; and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it: Then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both, that he hath not put his hand unto his neighbour's goods; and the owner of it shall accept thereof, and he shall not make it good. And if it be stolen from him, he shall make restitution unto the owner thereof (KJV, Exodus, 22:10-12).
G3P2 "The borrowed is destroyed for natural reasons. He should pay the loss."
And if a man borrow ought of his neighbour, and it be hurt, or die, the owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it good. But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good: if it be an hired thing, it came for his hire (KJV, Exodus, 22:14-15).
As we see, we deal here with the four last particulars (i.e. Talmudic axioms): (G1P1, G2P1, G2P2, G3P2). However, the data set for 'responsibility for the property of his neighbour' is not complete -we know nothing about the following two particulars (axioms) which are supposed also:
G1P2 "The safekeeping for free of charge is destroyed for natural reasons. What should he do?" G3P1 "The borrowed is stolen. What should he do?"
In the picture form, the complete data set must be seen as follows:
Nevertheless, in the Torah an appropriate data set is sketched in the following manner, i.e. it is absolutely incomplete for inferring 'responsibility for the property of his neighbour':
Thus, we need to find out possible ways for defining the two new axioms, G1P2 and G3P1. But how? Do not worry. In the Bava Metzia, the second of the first three tractates of the Babylonian Talmud in the order of Nezikin ("damages"), chapter 8, there is a metareasonig for this purpose -the inference metarule for defining new axioms, called qal wa-h . omer ( ‫וחמר‬ ‫.)קל‬ This rule occurs among the 7 rules of Hillel, as well as among the 13 rules of Rabbi Ishmael and the 32 rules of Rabbi Eliezer ben Jose HaGelili. Let us take all the particulars for G2, because they are complete. Between G2P1 and G2P2 there is a strong ordering relation: G2P2 G2P1. Indeed, G2P2 means that he is free of paying and G2P1 means that he should pay the loss. Hence, we assume that all last particulars (G1P1, G1P2, G2P1, G2P2, G3P1, G3P2) are partially ordered by a relation ' or =' denoted by , where = means the same payment. Then G1P2 is defined by qal wa-h . omer as follows: G1P2 = min(G2P2, G1P1).
From this it follows that
G1P2 "The safekeeping for free of charge is destroyed for natural reasons. He should swear that he did not lay his hand upon his neighbor's property."
Analogically, G3P1 is defined by qal wa-h . omer thus:
Then it is inferred that G3P1 "The borrowed is stolen. He should pay the loss."
So, the main goal of qal wa-h . omer is to add new axioms for the Torah data sets to make the proof trees more symmetrical: in the same tree t with only one root all subtrees must bear the same number of edges. For instance, in the tree In Section 1 we have said that the task of every true mathematician is to extend a set of mathematical axioms. In the statements like FLT we exceed the set of existing axioms (i.e. we put proofs outside of the foundation of mathematics). And we assume that the true mathematicians appeal to some inference metarule to obtain new axioms for proving their non-trivial sentences. In other words, they deal not with mechanical proofs from existing axioms within the foundations of mathematics, but they combine different trees to expand the set of possible axioms beyond any foundations of mathematics. This way of proving is called by us Talmudic because of the priority of the Talmudic logic in proposing some inference metarules for defining axioms. So, let us generalize definition 1 as follows. 
Definition 2 (Inference Metarule I). Let a tree
Thus, in the Talmudic foundations of mathematics we transform one space of mathematical proof trees into another space by some inference metarules. By analogy how in the Talmud we follow a transformation from one space of Biblical particular-and-general to another one. The proof trees supposed in the Torah are not complete and by the Talmudic inference metarules such as qal wa-h . omer we can make trees more symmetric so that their subtrees must have the same number of branches at the end.
METAREASONING IN MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
Let us consider an example from mathematical analysis to show that a mathematician, extending a mathematical horizon, operates with forests and appeals to metarules for combining different trees, indeed. Great mathematicians do not prove theorems in the way like a logical automaton does it. For example, Augustin-Louis Cauchy, the French mathematician of the 19th century who became a founder of modern mathematical analysis, put forward an axiom now called Dedekind Completeness for the expansion of mathematics. Due to this axiom, some properties of real numbers (nonlogical axioms describing real numbers) can have transmitted to complex numbers, vectors, and even infinite sequences by a mathematical analogy of the Talmudic qal wa-h . omer rule.
Cauchy Criterion
Let us denote an infinite sequence (i.e. a countable set) of objects x1, x2, . . . , x k , . . . by {xn}. Then some basic definitions of the Cauchy approach are as follows:
Let us denote definition 3 by Conv({xn}; R, | · |).

Definition 4. {xn} ⊂ R satisfies the Cauchy condition iff {xn} ⊂
R ∧ ∀(ε > 0)∃(Nε ∈ N)∀(m, n ∈ N|n ≥ Nε ∧ m ≥ Nε)[|xn − xm| < ε].
Definition 4 is denoted by CC({xn}; R, | · |)
Axiom 1 (Dedekind completeness). ∀(A ⊆
The completeness axiom is denoted by Ax3(A, B, a, b; R, |·|) .
Let us denote definition 5 by SES({[an, bn]}; R, | · |).
Theorem 1. This theorem called the Cauchy-Cantor's intersection theorem consists of two parts:
Existence of the common point (this property is denoted by ECP({[an, bn]}; R, | · |)):
∀({[an, bn]} ⊂ 2 R )[SES({[an, bn]}; R, | · |) → ∃(ξ ∈ R)∀(i ∈ N)[ξ ∈ [ai, bi]]].
Uniqueness of the common point (this property is denoted by SCP({[an, bn]}; R, | · |)):
ECP({[an, bn]}; R, | · |) ∧ bn − an
Proof.
(1) The existence of the common point:
The last inequality means that ξ is a common point of the nested closed intervals system. (2) The uniqueness of the common point. Assume a contrary:
It is a contradiction.
The statement of theorem 1 is denoted by CCP({ αn}; R, |· |) where αn = [an, bn] is a closed interval.
Definition 6. A sequence {xn} is called bounded iff
∃(C)∀(n ∈ N)[|xn| ≤ C].
Definition 6 is denoted by B({xn}; R, | · |).
Theorem 2 (Bolzano-Weierstrass). Each bounded sequence {xn} ⊆ R has a convergent subsequence {xn
Proof. The fact that {xn} is bounded means that
We apply the following algorithm notated as BWAlgo:
2. For all i ∈ N \ {0} let us divide [ai, bi] into two equal segments, and choose one of them which has an infinite number of members of the sequence, denote it by [ai+1, bi+1].
We obtain a sequence {[an, bn]} of closed intervals, i.e. there is SES({[an, bn]}; R, | · |).
All closed intervals in this sequence contain an infinite number of members of the sequence {x k }. Lengths of this closed intervals converge to zero: 
From this it follows that [[CCP({[an, bn]}; R, |·|) → ∃!(ξ ∈
R)∀(m ∈ N)[ξ ∈ [am, bm]]] → ∀(m ∈ N)[|x km − ξ| |bm − am|]] → |x km − ξ| R → 0.
Theorem 2 is denoted by BWT({xn}; R, | · |).
Theorem 3 (Triangle inequality). ∀(x, y ∈ R)[|x+ y| ≤ |x| + |y|].
The proof of theorem 3 for R is obvious. Let us denote its statement by Tr(x, y; R, | · |).
Theorem 4 (Cauchy criterion). ({xn}
. This means that {xn} is bounded. So, {xn} is bounded and BWT({xn};
The Cauchy criterion is denoted by CCrit({xn}; R, | · |).
Qal Wa-H . omer for the Cauchy Criterion
Let us fix the most important steps in the proofs of the previous subsection.
The proof of theorem 1 can be represented as the following tree:
the same is in the graph form:
The proof tree for theorem 2 is built up as follows:
which is pictured in the following manner:
SES({[an, bn]}; R, | · |)
BWAlgo {xn} is bounded
Let us define now the proof tree for theorem 4:
with the following graph:
Let us define an ordering relation among non-logical axioms, ≺, as follows: A ≺ B iff an axiom A is contained in the proof three of B. Hence, for t4 we obtain: 2. Also, sequences of vectors from R s can be formulated as CCrit({xn}; R s , · R s ) where
So, we can generalize theorem 4 (the Cauchy criterion) due to the fact that there is an analogue for the Dedekind completeness axiom (Ax3) (defined in real numbers) that holds for aforesaid types of numbers which can be represented as some tuples of real numbers. In this case some new inequalities ai ξi bi, i = 1, . . . , n for a = (a1, . . . , an), b = (b1, . . . , bn), ξ = (ξ1 . . . , ξn) take place instead of the one inequality of Ax3.
We can formulate the same generalization by using definition 2. Assume that we have some axioms (a 
Cauchy criterion in the functional analysis
By the end of the 19th century the mathematical objects for which applying Ax3 seems quite natural have been exhausted. The worlds of real numbers, complex numbers, vectors, and even infinite sequences have already been studied enough and mathematicians wanted something more, especially because there were problems of variation calculus that works with maps of maps. It has been assumed for a long period that the spaces of maps usually are infinite and so different from the well-studied finite-dimensional spaces in their basic properties. Further, in the minds of founders of the functional analysis there were born metric spaces X, where you can select a distance (metric) ρ : X 2 → R among elements, but it is impossible to determine a module (norm) of elements in any reasonable way.
Immediately 
is called complete.
The idea was to define the property Tr(x, y; X, ρ), natural for (R, | · |), on the elements of (X, ρ), by transforming this property from the derived theorem to the preexisted axiom, also by transforming CCrit({xn}; X, ρ) from the theorem to the axiom and by expecting that the final object will behave like numbers with almost the same structural theorems. Surprisingly, it became true! For example, for R there exists the compactness of the bounded and closed set and for the complete metric space of functions, continuous on [0, 1], with the norm x C = max t∈ [0, 1] |x(t)|, also there exists the compactness of the bounded set (with an additional condition of equicontinuity) -it is the claim of the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem, denoted by AAT, the analogue of BWT. The Cauchy-Cantor intersection theorem, i.e. CCP, gets its counterpart in the form of the topological CauchyCantor intersection theorem, denoted by TCCP, for the closed non-empty nested subsets of X.
Hence, the mathematicians of the end of the 19th century proposed to replace the axiom Ax3 by the theorem CCrit({xn}; X, ρ) in the proof trees and, as a result, they changed all proof sequences invented by the mathematicians of the early 19th century. They did it to extend the mathematical limits in building new proof trees. For instance, if we define an ordering relation among non-logical axioms, ≺, as follows: A ≺ B iff an axiom A is contained in the proof three of B, then the reasoning proposed by the mathematicians of the late 19th century is as follows: To sum up, it is important to point out that if the mathematicians followed the standard foundations of mathematics in fact, they would not change the proof sequence. But they did it indeed, because it is significant for drawing new trees by inference rules defined in definition 2. So, the new theorems AAT({xn}; X, ρ) and TCCP(X, ρ) allow the mathematicians to apply definition 2 in their reasoning more often and in more cases.
CONCLUSIONS
We have just tried to show that the mathematicians deal not with a logical way of automatic proving from some axioms, but with combining proof trees on tree forests by using the analogy as an inference metarule. For the first time, such metarules were proposed in the Talmud within a general Judaic approach to concurrent or even massive-parallel conclusions, see [4] , [5] . The mathematician does not think sequentially like a logical automaton, but concurrently, also.
In the logical foundations of mathematics there are two approaches in drawing computer-assisted proofs: (i) automated theorem proving (i.e. proving mathematical theorems by computer programs) and (ii) automated proof checking (i.e. using computer programs for checking proofs for correctness). There are many objections for these approaches. For instance, for (i) one the main objections is that these methods do not give new and useful concepts in mathematics in fact, but they present just a long gloomy calculation. For (ii) one of the main objections is that these methods can check just very simple theorems. There are no even insights how to check FLT by computer programs.
In our opinion, the most significant problem of existing logical foundations of mathematics is that a mathematical proof is considered a discrete process that can be formalized by discrete methods. However, it is only a hypothesis that mathematics can be reduced to logic and the mathematical thinking is discrete. We can assume that it is not so and a mathematical proof is an operation in a space of proof trees with some topological properties. As a result, the mathematical proof can be formalized just by analog computations, not discrete ones. The meaning of mathematical proofs is to transform one space of proof trees to another space with inducing new topological properties. For example, in the Talmud this transformation means that each branch in proof trees with one root should have the same number of subbranches and inferring allows us to construct additional subbranches to make the trees more symmetric. In mathematics the goal of proofs is quite similar and it is to extend the mathematical limits to make proof trees in forests more symmetric, too.
Hence, we suppose that computer-assisted proofs can be based on some analog computations involving topological properties of proof trees.
